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What Were the War Strategies for Each Side in the Civil War Apush Chapter 21 Review

To get a better understanding of how the Ceremonious State of war played out every bit it did, it is helpful to evaluate the strategies of both the N and the Southward in the Civil War.

The battles and events that took place were not random encounters or skirmishes but were instead, well-planned and thought-out strategies to secure supplies, keep lines of military communication open, prevent wide calibration casualties and to gain and control more footing.

Both sides had their own ideas on how to achieve this and the strategies they used have been widely scrutinized, studied, evaluated and recreated ever since.

In fact, numerous Civil War strategy games are based on these very strategies and some types of battle reenactments, such as tactical battles or tactical events, use these strategies to try to defeat their opponents in recreations of the battles.

The following is an overview of the strategies used in the Civil War:

Union Strategy:

At a cabinet meeting on June 29, 1861, Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, general-in-chief of the U.S. army and a veteran of the Mexican war, proposed a military strategy to defeat the Confederacy.

Although the Union had a big regular army on its side, Scott doubted the scores of newly recruited soldiers would be ready for boxing in time and instead proposed that they isolate the Southward from the rest of the southern states.

The idea was that it would put an economic stranglehold on the Confederacy, isolate it from all sources of supply and allow for growth of anti-secessionist sentiments which would somewhen cause the S to surrender without the utilise of violence and would therefore save more than lives.

Scott farther proposed that if the strategy didn't work, the Union could raise an army of 300,000 soldiers that could invade the Due south and win the war inside two to iii years.

Scott's great serpent. Cartoon map illustrating Gen. Winfield Scott's Anaconda program, by J.B. Elliott, circa December 1861

The press dubbed the strategy the "Anaconda Plan," naming it afterward the Anaconda ophidian that slowly squeezes its victim to death. The plan received a lot of criticism and was originally rejected considering it was accounted too dull and cumbersome, according to the book Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Army:

"Public stance held that the war would exist short, and information technology demanded an invasion to destroy the rebellion. At the same chiffonier meeting, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, commander of the Army of Northeastern Virginia, proposed to attack and destroy the Confederate army assembling in the vicinity of Manassas Junction. Northern newspapers trumpeted 'On to Richmond' (the Confederate capital letter) and expected a victorious Wedlock ground forces soon to march into the city. Scott's plan was disregarded, and McDowell'due south was accepted. The result would be Spousal relationship defeat at Starting time Bull Run."

Later a serial of early on military defeats, the Anaconda plan was revisited though, according to the book Atlas of the Civil War:

"Only after hopes of quick victory were dashed would the public recognize the grim necessity of slowly throttling the Confederacy. Ideas that once seemed far-fetched – such every bit wrecking the Southern economy past preventing cotton fiber from reaching market and causing slaves to insubordinate or flee their cruel overseers began to make sense every bit Northerners realized that their foes would not yield until deprived of the means to wage war."

The Anaconda program called for a full blockade of the Southern coastline and command of the Mississippi River. The Mississippi River was the South'south major inland waterway and was a valuable transportation and shipping route.

In addition, decision-making the river meant the Union army could isolate Texas, Arkansas and Louisiana from the other Confederate states and split the Confederacy in 2.

The Marriage naval blockade was established in 1861 simply was ineffective, allowing around one in three occludent runners to break through.

Then, in March of 1862, the Union launched a campaign to seize command of the Mississippi River in the North and also captured New Orleans in April.

The Union's strategy was highly and then successful that it prompted the Confederates to aggressively counterattack in response, particularly in General Lee's failed Gettysburg entrada in 1863, which caused such devastating losses that it is considered by many historians to exist the beginning of the end for the Confederacy.

Afterwards the autumn of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863 and Port Hudson in Louisiana on July 9, 1863, the Matrimony won complete command of the Mississippi river.

These aspects of the Anaconda programme were important, but information technology was nonetheless necessary to destroy the Confederate regular army in social club to force the South to surrender. The Union leaders at the time were reluctant to directly engage Confederate troops, much to Lincoln'southward dismay.

Although Lincoln had very limited armed forces feel, he felt very strongly that the Matrimony should take advantage of its large army and aggressively engage the Confederates simultaneously in different locations to overwhelm them, according to a letter he wrote to his generals Buell and Halleck:

"I state my general idea of this state of war to be, that we have the greater numbers … that we must fail unless we can observe some way of making our reward an overmatch for his; and that this can merely exist done past menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time."

This strategy is eventually what prompted Lincoln to promote like-minded Ulysses Southward. Grant to the position of Lieutenant-General in March of 1864, naming him General-in-primary of the Armies of the Us in the process.

Ulysses S. Grant's strategy to win the war was purely one of offense, according to the book Memorial Life of Gen. Ulysses South. Grant:

"And then far as the strategy of the Lieutenant-General is to be described, it consisted a good bargain in fighting the enemy, while localities like Richmond, Charleston, etc. were in themselves merely minor considerations. He believed that hard fought battles were a mercy to the army, and that heavy lists of killed and wounded went far to reduce the totals of those sacrificed in war compared with the losses by illness through inactivity and exposure consequent upon a long-fatigued-out policy of manuevering and defensive warfare. Grant believed in strategy, but it was a strategy which involved fighting the enemy, not circumventing him. The new commander saw that the only route to peace was a devastation of the rebel armies."

The Union started to fight the Confederates more than aggressively and, in 1864, General William Tecumseh Sherman led his troops on his famous March to the Sea, during which the troops captured and destroyed annihilation they came across. This further deprived the Confederates of the nutrient and supplies they desperately needed.

When the majuscule of the Confederacy, Richmond, Va, was captured in April of 1865, the Confederate's line of commands were completely disrupted. The invading Union forces slowly began to close in on and isolate the various units of Confederate troops beyond the Due south, forcing them to surrender.

Confederate Strategy:

At first, the Confederacy just wanted to survive and defend its correct to secede. They had no interest in invading Union territory. As the Wedlock army went on the offense and prepared to invade the Southward, the Confederate army went on the defense force and prepared themselves for attack.

Due to the Confederate army's pocket-size size, Confederate President Jefferson Davis planned to avoid major battles with the Wedlock army to prevent annihilation of his army and instead planned to only participate in small, limited engagements when the odds were in their favor.

This is referred to as a strategy of attrition – a strategy of winning by not losing and merely wearing out the enemy past prolonging the state of war and making it too costly to go along.

The problem with this strategy is the governors, congressmen and residents of the various border states along the Confederate perimeter requested the presence of small armies in those states to prevent confronting Matrimony invasion.

This led to small armies being dispersed around the Confederate perimeter along the Arkansas-Missouri border, at several points on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, along the Tennessee-Kentucky border, and in the Shenandoah Valley and western Virginia too equally at Manassas.

Known as the "Cordon Defense," this spread the Confederate army so thin that Union forces could hands interruption through somewhere, which they did at several points in 1862.

There was too a growing need within the Confederacy to exist more aggressive and assault the Union army before they could assault them.

In response, Davis instead settled on an "offensive-defensive" strategy in which troops would exist moved around to encounter war machine needs instead of trying to defend the border and, if the opportunity presented itself, to go on the offensive and perchance fifty-fifty invade the North.

To pressure Europe into helping them, the Confederates cut off Europe'south supply of cotton fiber in an attempt to gain leverage. This backfired though when Europe instead chose to go their cotton from Republic of india and Egypt. As a result, the Confederates couldn't earn enough money to pay for guns, ammunition or supplies.

All the same, an article by Terry L. Jones in the New York Times argues that the lack of funds caused by their withholding of cotton was merely a minor effect for the Confederacy and did non ultimately crusade its defeat:

"Amalgamated defeat has also been blamed on Rex Cotton diplomacy. If the Confederates had sent every bit much cotton as possible to Europe earlier the occludent became effective instead of hording it to create a shortage, they could take established lines of credit to purchase state of war material. This argument is truthful, but it misses the betoken. While the Confederates did suffer severe shortages by mid-war, they never lost a boxing because of a lack of guns, ammunition or other supplies. They did lose battles because of a lack of men, and a broken-down railway system made it difficult to move troops and materials to critical points. Cotton wool affairs would not accept increased the size of the rebel armies, and an increasingly effective Spousal relationship blockade would take prevented the importation of railroad fe and other supplies no thing how much credit the Confederates accumulated overseas."

Although the bulk of the Confederate leaders opposed the idea of invading the N, Robert Due east. Lee was determine to exercise so after his surprising victory at the Peninsula and at Second Manassas in 1862.

Lee knew the South lacked the industry to sustain a long war and he believed invading the N afterward his recent victories would sustain a psychological blow to the Union, according to an article by Scott Hartwig on the Civil War Trust website:

"Lee understood from the starting time of the war that the Confederacy'south best hope for independence rested upon the morale of the Northern people. If they believed the war could not exist won, or could just be won at too high a cost, and then Southern independence became a real possibility. Amalgamated military machine successes were the ways to erode morale and create this political climate. The fall elections in the North were approaching. England and France stood on the sidelines watching closely, carefully weighing whether they should recognize the Confederacy. Lee sensed a great opportunity was at hand. He believed the Marriage army was disorganized and demoralized. He as well knew that information technology was receiving many reinforcements in the grade of newly raised regiments in answer to President Lincoln's July telephone call for 300,000 volunteers. Only i move would force the Federals to identify their army in the field before they had reorganized and offered the best take a chance to practise further damage to Northern morale: Invade the border state of Maryland."

By invading Maryland and posing a threat to cities like Harrisburg, Philadelphia and even Washington D.C., Lee believed it would encourage secessionists in those areas and would pressure level Lincoln and other leaders to curtail armed forces operations or perhaps negotiate with the Confederates.

The invasion didn't work though and the Confederates were defeated in that campaign at the famous Battle of Antietam. That Union victory and then prompted President Abraham Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Announcement, which officially made the state of war about slavery and, in turn, prevented United kingdom or France from supporting the Confederacy.

Yet, this defeat didn't stop Lee from making some other attempt to invade the Northward in 1863. With the important urban center of Vicksburg, Mississippi nether threat of Union assail and command of the Mississippi River at stake, Lee argued, during a meeting with other Amalgamated leaders in mid-May in 1863, that the all-time way to bring the state of war to an stop would be to invade the North for a 2nd fourth dimension, according to the book Robert Due east. Lee: Legendary Commander of the Confederacy:

"Recognizing these threats, several Confederate leaders urged Lee to send some of his troops to reinforce the threatened points. Some even urged him to have command against Grant. Lee refused. The best way for the Confederacy to win, he argued, was for him to invade the North a 2nd time. He insisted that if he could win a victory on Northern soil, Lincoln would think his armies from the Deep S to go along the Army of Northern Virginia from marching all over the North. As he had done before Antietam, Lee also argued that a successful Southern invasion would demoralize the North and perhaps erode its will to fight."

Lee was then popular with Davis and the other Amalgamated leaders that they agreed to his plan. Lee's plan failed though when he lost the nearly famous battle of the Civil War, the Battle of Gettysburg in July of 1863.

The battle ended up being disastrous for the Confederates, who lost 25,000 soldiers over the course of three-day-long battle. Gettysburg is considered a major turning point in the Civil War because it caused such devastating losses for the Confederates that they were never able to fully recover.

The boxing marked the beginning of the end for the Confederates. The gamble to invade the north had backfired and many historians believe information technology cost them the war in the end.

Lee never once more attempted another invasion of the Northward and instead focused solely on defending any land they still controlled. Equally the state of war progressed though, the Confederates lost more than and more ground likewise as more soldiers, ammunition, food and supplies.

The war finally came to a close later General Lee and his Ground forces of Northern Virginia became trapped by invading Union forces in Appomattox county, Va and were forced to surrender. This prompted similar surrenders past remaining Confederate troops across the South, which finally brought an stop to the Civil War.

Sources:
Allen, Stephen Merrill. Memorial Life of General Ulysses S. Grant: With Biological Sketches of Lincoln, Johnson, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, His Associates in the Government. Boston: Webster Historical Society, 1889.
Anderson, Paul Christopher. Robert East. Lee: Legendary Commander of the Confederacy. New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2003.
Chocolate-brown, Jerold E. Historical Dictionary of the U.Due south. Regular army. Westport: Greenwood Printing, 2001.
Beringer, E. Richard, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Nevertheless, Jr. Why The South Lost The Civil War. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986.
Hyslop, Stephen Garrison. Atlas of the Civil War: A Comprehensive Guide to the Tactics and Terrain of The Civil State of war. Washington D.C.: National Geographic Order, 2009.
Stoker, Donald. The Thousand Blueprint: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
"Appomatox Court House." Civil War Trust, world wide web.civilwar.org/learn/civil-war/battles/appomattox-court-house
Hartwig, Scott. "The Maryland Campaign of 1862." Ceremonious State of war Trust, www.civilwar.org/learn/manufactures/maryland-campaign-1862
Greenbaum, Mark. "Lincoln's Exercise-Nada Generals." New York Times, 27 Nov. 2011,opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/lincolns-practise-zippo-generals/
"Anaconda Programme." Civil War University, www.civilwaracademy.com/anaconda-program
"Offense or Defense force?" Virginia Historical Society, www.vahistorical.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history-explorer/american-turning-indicate-ceremonious-war-virginia/wagi-3
Jones, Terry. "Could the Southward Have Won the War?" New York Times, 16 Mar. 2015, opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/sixteen/could-the-s-have-won-the-state of war/
Farmer, Alan. "Why Was the Confederacy Defeated?" History Today, Sept. 2005, www.historytoday.com/alan-farmer/why-was-confederacy-defeated
Swayne, Matthew. "Union's Strategy Trouble Prolonged Ceremonious State of war." Futurity, 26 Jun. 2012, www.hereafter.org/union%E2%80%99s-strategy-trouble-prolonged-civil-war/
"Northern Plans to Cease the War." U.Southward. History Online Textbook, www.ushistory.org/usa/33h.asp

What Were the Major Strategies of the Civil War

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